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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JTFJ! CHIROPRACTIC ASSOCIATION,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
No. 15345
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES

and DESERET MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
DESERST MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

NATURE OF CASE
The action in the district court was an appeal of
certain findings and orders of the Commissioner of Insurance
pursuant to section 31-4-10 of the Utah Code.

The respondent

~es not believe that the issues confronting this Court present

questions of first impression.

!. i
,..,)

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
by the Honorable Dean E. Conder, dismissed the action as against

Deseret Mutual Benefit Association on the basis that the appeal
was not taken within the one-month period provided for such an

appeal in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 124-125).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment of the district court should be
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent must take exception to many of the
statements made in the appellant's lengthy, and at points
immaterial, statement of facts.

The following exceptions

are noted:
1.

Discrimination against chiropractors by

was not established at the December 21, 1976, hearing
there was no lack of due process.

oo~

a~

The Commissioner of In·

surance held that the schedule of benefits under the employ,;
benefit program of the respondent was not discriminatory
against chiropractors.

(R.

32-39) .

The schedule of benefits in question was organized
to pay claims at three different levels.

Type 1 benefits wen

paid at the rate of 100 percent of the usual, reasonable anc
customary charges.

Type 2 benefits were paid at 80 percent

of the usual, reasonable and customary charges.

Finally'

type 3 benefits, which include maternity expenses, consultat;:
for emotional illness, and vertebral column rehabilitation,
were paid at 50 percent of the usual, reasonable and customar
charges.

(R.

96-97).

The charge made was that the respondent discrimina:'
against the chiropractors by paying only 50 percen
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t for ver'.'·

,oiwnn rehabilitation (R. 32).
In the hearing before the Commissioner of Insurance
Jn oecember 2 2, 19 7 6, the appellant was represented by both
oaniel L. Berman and Gordon Strachan of Berman and Giauque.
i·litnesses were called and sworn and testimony was given before
the commissioner who was represented by Mr. William G. Gibbs,
special assistant attorney general.
was submitted to the Commissioner.

Further additional material
Based thereupon, the Comm-

issioner made his "Findings and Order" dated April 25, 1977.
(R. 32-33) •

A transcript of the proceedings was prepared by

Barbara G. Anderson, CSR ( R. 52) .
After a careful consideration of Utah's Insurance
Equality Law, section 31-27-4 of the Utah Code, the Commissioner
concluded that the legislature intended to assure equal treatment of practitioners who provide similar services (paragraph
5, R. 34-35); that vertebral column rehabilitation may be per-

formed by a physician, a therapist or a chiropractor and that
neither the DMBA insurance policy or practice discriminates
against chiropractors in the payment for providing these
services (paragraph 5, R. 34-35); that a policy holder's freedom of choice in the selection of a practitioner as contemplated by the Insurance Equality Law is not violated by a
policy that limits the number of treatments or dollar amounts
covered of some treatments and not others (paragraph 8, R.
37 -38); and that there is value in allowing an insurance

company to write insurance with limited coverage for both

-3-
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illness and treatment because by expanding coverage be~~
intention of the writer of the policy, the premium must c·
accordingly

(paragraph 8, R. 37-38).

2.

Appellant distorts a statement concerning t.

accuracy of cost justifications

(11.ppellant' s Brief, P. J:.

The statement in full is that " [ t) he above cost estimates,
quite accurate in some cases and little rnore that guesses
other areas where data is unavailable ."
3.

(R.

75).

The appellant s"':ates that the notice of the

Commissioner's decision was mailed to the counsel for the
appellant, citing the record at page 111 (Appellant's Brie'
P. 4) .

Page 111 is a portion of the appellant's memoranc:::

submitted to the district court on the same subject which
makes the same statement but without any authority.

There

nothing in the record to support such a contention.

Howe':;

it

is clear from the Findings and Order of the Comrnissiw:

of Insurance that the office of Berman

&

Giauque received'

copy of the Findings and Order,dated April 25, 1977, on Apr

26, 1977, because an office stamp on the first page contair.:
the following:
RECEIVED
BERMAN & GIAUQUE
4-26-77
(R.

32).

4.

The respondent denies that there is "overwhe~·-

.
.
. . t
oractices"
evidence in the hearing record of d1scr1m1na ory ,
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--t.ht
a the respondent failed to justify its practices at the

hearing·
5.

The respondent has no knowledge concerning the

dealings the appellant had with the Commissioner of Insurance
as alleged on page 2 of its brief wherein it alleges inaction
on the part of the Commissioner of Insurance concerning certain unspecified requests and meetings.
6.

The respondent denies that the appellant filed

a statement of particulars in the court below, as required
by law.

7.

The appellant distorts the import of the notice

of jurisdictional deficiency filed with the district court by
Mr.

William G. Gibbs, special assistant attorney general and

counsel for the State Insurance Department (R. 54-55).

This

notice is in the nature of advice from a friend of the court
concerning possible problems with the timing of the appeal of
the Commissioner's decision.

It notifies the court. that "there

is a question whether it has jurisdiction over the appeal."
It does not,

as alleged, urge dismissal.

There is nothing in

the record that supports the contention that the Commissioner
was "[c] oncerned by the prospect of having his findings and
orjers reviewed by the District Court. "(Appellant's Brief,
p' 5) '

The question raised by the Commissioner is by no

means a "novel argument" as alleged (Appellant's Brief, P. 5),
but is based upon the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case
law.

Further, it is untrue that DMBA and Equitable joined in
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the Commissioner's

"motion" because the

Commissioner n
eve:
made a motion before the court and DMBA and Equitable
were
acting independently.

ARGUMENT
The question for review presented to this Court::
neither novel nor unusual.

It is whether the appeals pro-

visions of the Insurance Code are in ccnflict with or incon·
sis tent with the rules concerning the time for taking an ap;'
as found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The respondent presents the following points to
support the district court's determination:

I.

The Appeals Procedure Found in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Apoly to the
Practice and Procedure in Appealing fror:.
any Order, Ruling or other Action of any
Administrative Body to the Extent that
the Statutory Procedure in Connection w1t'.
Such an Appeal or Review Is Not in ConfE:·
and Is Not Inconsistent with the Ut~
Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 81 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure u:.::
a heading entitled "General Provisions" states:
On Appeal from or Review of a Ruling or
an Order of an Administrative Board or Agency.
These rules shall apply to the practice and
procedure in appealing from or obtaining.a
review of any order, ruling or other action
of an administrative board or agency, except
insofar as the specific statutory procedure
in connection with any such appeal or review
is in conflict er inconsistent with these
rules.
Therefore, based upon Rule 81 (d) , part IX of ~:le

-6-
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Rules entitled "Appeals", encompassing Rules 72-76, ought to
apply unless there are provisions to the contrary on inconsiscent with these rules.
A case in support of this proposition is National
.~dvertising Co.

486 P.2d 383

v. Utah State Road Cornrn'n, 26 Utah 2d 132,

(1971).

In that case, the claim was made that

the appellant filed his appeal from a decision of the Utah
state Road Cornrniss ion in an untimely manner.

The appellant

argued that the Road Commission's own rules could not determine the length of time within which an appeal must be taken
to the district court.

This Court agreed with this proposition,

but stated that it was not important because the same time
period was provided in the Utah Rules of

Civ~l

Procedure which

"'ere applicable to the review of the decision of the Utah State
Road Commission.

See footnote 2 on page 384 wherein the Court

recognized that Rule 81 applies to the appeal time on the
review of decisions of administrative agencies.
Hence, there is nothing new in Utah law concerning
the applicability of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the
time for taking an appeal of the decisions of administrative
agencies.

II.

The Insurance Code,Containing No
Provision Concerning the Time for
Taking an Appeal to the District
Court, Is Not in Conflict with and
Is Not Inconsistent with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure which Prescribe a One-Month Appeals Period

There is no question, as the appellant asserts, that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Insurance Code has certain provisions dealing
from a decision of the Commissioner of Insurance.
the crucial fact is this:

There is no provision

'th

w1

appe'

However,

-

int~~

surance Code that prescribes the time period within which a:
appeal must be taken to the Third Judicial District court c'.
Salt Lake County .

The appellant misses the point when it attempts t
point out the differences between the appeals procedures fu:
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and those found in the
Ir.surance Code.

It is true that r.ot all of the appeals pro·

cedures are identical.

However, concerning the only procea;;,

issue facing the Court now--the timing of the appeal--there
is no conflict or inconsistency, because the

Insurance~&

simply has no provision whatsoever concerning the time for
taking an appeal.
It is immaterial that the appeals procedures pro·
vided in the Utah Code for other administrative bodies may t
"more amenable" to the appeals provisions of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The point is that the time for taking r

appeal from any decision of any administrative agency is go':·
erned by the appeals procedures of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure unless there is a conflicting appeals period founc
elsewhere in the Utah Code.
There is no question that the proceeding in the
Third District court of Salt Lake County is an appeal.

sec·

tion 31-4-9 of the Utah Code provides that an aggrieved par::
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in:iY

"~peal

from the commissioner's order .

.

. • An appeal

may be taken only to the district court of Salt Lake county

...

(Emphasis added) .

Section 31-4-10 of

code is entitled "Manner of taking appeal."

th~

Utah

(Emphasis Added).

Further references throughout the next preceding sections
clearly indicate that the nature of the proceeding is an
"appeal".
Moreover, it is stated that:
The court shall hear the appeal upon the
transcript of the record of the commission's
hearing and on such additional proper evidence
as may be offered by any party. After considering the evidence the court may affirm,
modify, or set aside the order appealed from.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-4-12 ( 197 4) •
The appeal is taken by filing with the clerk a petition for a review (similar to a notice of appeal) and a
statement of particulars in which is claimed that the order
is in error (similar to a statement of points which must be
served, i f required, within 10 days after the filing of the
notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 73 (d)) and a statement of
relief prayed for.
In summary, the Utah Chiropractic
i!ttempted to take an

Association, Inc.

appeal from the Findings and Order of

the Commissioner of Insurance.

The appeals procedure contained

in the Insurance Code does not specify a time period within
which the appeal must be taken.

Therefore, there is nothing

inconsistent with the procedures regarding the

time for taking

an appeal as found in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which,
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according to Rule 81, must be applied.

III.

The Appellant Did Not Take a
Timely Appeal from the Findings
and Order of the Commissioner of
Insurance whether the Provisions
of Rule 73(a)-(g) Are Applied or
whether the Provisions of Rule
73(h)-(m) Are Applied

The appellant attempts to argue that the appeal fr
the decision of the Commissioner of Insurance is more anall:.
to an appeal from a judgment rendered in a city or justice
court than to an appeal from the judgment of a district cou;·
Under the facts of this case, the respondent contends

ili~

..

is immaterial which of the two appeals procedures found in
Rule 7 3 is applied.

However, if a choice had to be made be: .

the two, it would appear that the provisions contained in Ru:
73 (a) - (g) should apply to this
1.

case for the following reasc:

The Commissioner of Insurance conducted an ex-

tensive hearing into a matter that is peculiarly within his
field of expertise and responsibility.
2.

The appeal at the district court level would

cE

primarily a review of the record made by the Commissioner of
Insurance during the December 22, 1976 hearing.
legislature used the term "de novo"
Utah Code Ann.

§ 31-4-9

sequent section provides

Althoughb

in describing the appea::

(1974), specific language in a sub(a) that the court shall hear t~

appeal upon the transcript of the record of the commissione!':
hearing and on such additional pror:er evidence as may

-10-
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be offe:

by the parties and

(b) that the reviewing court has au th-

ority to affirm, modify, or set aside the order appealed
::·om.
15

Utah Code Ann. § 31-4-12

(1974).

Such a procedure

similar to the procedure followed by the Utah Supreme

court in a review of a judgment of the district court with
the exception that additional testimony is not taken.
3.

In this case, it is not likely that there will

be much, if any,

additional testimony presented to the dis-

trict court beyond what is contained in the 129-page transcript from the Commissioner of Insurance.

The appellant's

"Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Orders of
Commissioner of Insurance"

(R. 2-24), submitted to the district

c:iurt concurrently with its petition for review,

(a) bears a

striking resemblance to an appellant's brief and (b) is based
upon the record established at the hearing before the
Commissioner of Insurance.
4.

The procedure relating to an appeal from a city

or justice court provides that:
All causes appealed to the district court
shall be heard anew.
Pleadings may be amended
in all respects in the same manner and upon the
same terms as pleadings in cases originally
commenced therein .
Rule 73 (m), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appeal is not

a matter of review, but a matter of starting afresh with new
pleadings, discovery and trial.
by

The

the apreal
s
i:function of

procedure

Such is

not

found in the

the district

-11-

court

contemplated

Insurance
in

this

case

Code.
would
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have been very similar to the function of the Utah

sup re~.,

Court in handling an appeal and quite dissimilar to the
function of the district court in a de ~ trial originated in a city or justice court.
The Court can avoid the issue of which appeals ...
,.
visions to apply because under either set of rules, the
appellant failed to file his appeal in a timely

fashi~.

Rule 73 (a) - (g). Under the primary procedure, the
time within which an appeal is to be taken is specified as
one month

from the date of the entry of the judgment or

order appealed fron.
cedure.

Rule 73 (a) , Utah Rules of Civil Pro-

The Findings a:id Order were signed by the Cammi-

ssioner on April 25, 1977, which act is synonymous with tje
entry of a judgment in the district court.

Therefore, the

last day that an appeal could have been filed was May 25,
1977.

See In re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d454

(1953)

for the formula used to calculate the concluding day

of the one-month period.

Because the petition was not filei

until May 27, 1977, it was not filed in a timely manner.
Rule 73 (h) - (m).

If the other appeals provisions;:

applied, the same results follow.

The appellant claimed tr.::

a notice of the decision was mailed to the appellant.
ellant' s Brief, P. 17) .

IAW

For support for this statement re:-

erence is made by the appellant to page 111 of the record.
Page 111 of the record is simply page 2 of a memorandum

r;~::

by the appellant in the district court to support the same
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. ·
? 05 1t1on.

rt is there stated that "[c]o,..,bs
[sic] were
I:"""

mailed to counsel for petitioner."

Nothing further is cited

for the proposition in the memorandum to the district court.
:ioreovsr, there is nothing in the record before this court

w indicate that a notice of the Findings and Order was mailed
to the appellant's attorneys.
office of Berman

&

It is clear, however, that the

Giauque actually received a copy of the

Findings and Order on April 26, 1977, thereby giving notice
of the adverse decision (R. 32).

Rule 73 (h) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal may be taken to the
filstrict court from the final judgment of a city or justice
court within one month
judgment.

after notice of the entry of such

Because notice was received by the appellant on

Aprii 26, 1977, the one-month period expired on May 26, 1977.
Hence, under either set of procedures, the petition, which
was not filed until May 27, 1977, was not timely filed.
The case of Glad v. Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah 1977),
is not applicable because it deals with the computation of
time when the last day of the one-month appeal period falls
on a Sunday.

In this case, both May 25 and 26, 1977 are

weekdays that are not legal holidays.

Hence, no extra days

beyond the one-month appeal period would be allowed under
~le 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures.

IV.

A Court of Review Has No Jurisdiction
to Entertain an Appeal When the Request
for an Appeal Is Not Timely

I! 1 1T\any instances,

the failure of a party to follow
-13-
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strictly the requirements of the appeals rules doesnot o::
the validity of the appeal.

However, the rules and case;

explicit that the failure to timely file a notice of apps:
is jurisdictional in the sense that the revie\·1ing court~:
not consider the matter any further and that such an ap;,,
can be and should be dismissed, even if no

motion to tha'

effect has been made by a party.
This is alluded to in Rule 73 (a)

(first puagrac'

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein the one-mont'.
requirement for notice of appeal is stated.

In the third

paragraph it is stated:
Failure of the appellant to take any of the
further steps to secure the review of the
judgment appealed from does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only
for such remedies as are specified in this
rule or, when no remedy is. specified, for
such action as the Supreme Court deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of
the appeal.
(Emphasis added) .

The clear implication from this statemer:

is that the failure of the appellant to take any of the prs·
ceding steps to secure review of the judgment (such as

t1~e.

filing in the first paragraph) does affect the validity of
the appeal.
The cases are clear on this point.

For example,

in Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (19 55 '
the Court stated:
The purpose of this Rule to make jurisdictional a failure to file the notice of
appeal on time is clearly evident by the

-14-
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special provision therein that:
"Failure of the appellant to take
anv of the further steps to secure the
review of the judgment appealed from
does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such
remedies as are specified . . . . "
(Italics supplied [by Anderson court].)
282 P.2d at 847.

In that case, the Court dismissed the appeal where
the notice had been filed on March 24, 1954, which was more
than a month after the trial court, on February 23, 1954, had
denied the petition to vacate its order.
To the same affect is In re Estate of Ratliff, 19
Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967), wherein this Court stated:
Since the notice was filed more than one
month after the entry of judgment or the
order appealed from (Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.),
this court 1acks jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal, and is therefore compelled to
order a dismissal thereof.
431 P.2d at 573-74.
It i.s not possible to "smooth the edges" of this
rule.

For example, in In re Lynch's Estate,123 Utah 57, 254

P.2d 454 (1953), the trial court denied the motion to amend
or to grant a new trial on November 22, 1952.

The notice of

appeal was filed on December 23, 1952, the day after an appeal
would l1ave been timely filed.

Despite the closeness of the

filir.g, this Court held that the appeal could not be entertained.
The law that the filing of the notice of appeal is
jurisdictional continues the law and practice existing before
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the enactment of the present rules.
Garner, 45 Utah 39, 143 P. 228

For example, in ~

(1914), this Court

stated tho

the filing of a notice of appeal was jurisdictional in t~
sense that it

11

affects the power of this court to hear and

determine the appeal .

II

143 P. at 229.

To the same

effect is Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177, 27 P.2d 439
(1939).
The prevailing party has never been required to,
prejudice to support the dismissal of an untir.lely appeal. '.
rule is absolute in nature when an untimely appeal is attem:
from a final order or judgment.
The case of Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P..
634

(1966), is not to the contrary.

In Wood, this Court he:.

that the premature filing of a notice of appeal from the de;.
of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, made within one mo:.:
after the district court had stated that the petition was co
ied but before the signing and filing of a formal judgment,
not a defect which would necessarily deprive the appellate
court of jurisdiction but was an irregularity which could be
the grounds for dismissal of an appeal within the discretior.
of the court.
dicate

Two sentences from that opinion, however,~

that the case has no application here:
It is true that this court has previously held that the filing of a notice
of appeal after the expiration of the one
month allowed by the rule is a jurisdictional defect.
Our conclusion in this
case represents no departure from that
holding.

419 P.2d at 635.
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The case of National Advertising Co. v. Utah State
~ad commission

, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971), does

net alter the rule that the late filing of an appeal is a
jurisdictional defect.

National Advertising dealt with an

appeal from the State Road Commission, which appeal was not
taken until several months after the plaintiff received a
notice of the Commission's decision.

The district court

accepted review of the Commission's action and the Utah Supreme court held that the trial court was within its prerogative in doing so.
However, it appears that the decision appealed from
was not final until several months after the written decision
was handed down :
But it is also true that the plaintiff sought
modification and change in the order and that
there continued to be negotiations and correspondence between the parties concerning the
carrying out of the requirement imposed by the
Road Commission until what appears to be a
definite and final refusal of the Commission to
change its order on July 11, 1969. The court
proceeding was initiated within the 30 days
thereafter on July 22.
486 P. 2d at 384.

Footnore 3 on page 384 of the same decision

further amplifies the interlocutory nature of the written
decision:
The detail of the events would unduly
and unnecessarily extend the opinion,
but they include the fact that under
plaintiff's claims it promptly (within
four days after receiving notice) requested by letter of April 3, 1969, an
extension of time to appeal; and that
by a letter of April 8 the Commission
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granted S'Jch extension, also referring
to what should be done about the sign;
and that there continued to be negotiations from which the plaintiff could
reasonably believe the matter was not
closed until the final action of the
committee on July 11.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the Findings
and Order of the Commissioner of Insurance were final.

The

appellant does not contend that any further negotiations
or discussions were conducted between the Commissioner of
Insurance and the appellant.

Hence, the Findings and Order

being final, the starting of the appeal time would not have
been extended as in National Advertising.

V.

There Is No Reason to Apply Established Jurisdictional Requirements
Prospectively Only.

The appellant would have this Court apply the jurL·
dictional requirements of the timely filing of an appeal of a
decision of an administrative body prospectively only, despi::
the provisions of Rule 81 (d)

and the case of National Adverti'

Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d
383

(1971), which announced six years ago that Rule 81 makes

the appeals provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
applicable to appeals from administrative bodies, unless
contrary to statute.

This Court is not being asked to de-

clare any statute or long-established principle invalid;
instead, it is being asked to affirm a judgment based upon
established procedural law.

Justice does not require that

-18-
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'.'ese established jurisdictional requirements be applied
prospectively only·

CONCLUSION
The Commissioner of Insurance absolved the respondent
from the charges of the appellant that it was discriminating
against chiropractors.

The Commissioner held a lengthy hearing

during which able counsel for the ai;:ipellant presented their
case against the respondent.

The Commissioner ruled, in

essence, that the respondent did not discriminate against chiropractors by the terms of its policy and procedures.

The

appellant did receive a fair and impartial hearing of its
complaint.
Although the appellant desired to appeal the Comm1ssioner' s ruling, it did not do so in a timely fashion.
a failure is jurisdictional and absolute.

Such

The appellant is

not saved by resort to the appeals procedures applied to appeals
from a city or justice court because the record clearly indicates that the appellant had notice of the decision of the
Commissioner more than one month before it attempted to take
its appeal.

There is nothing contained in the appeals pro-

'1isions of the Insurance Code that is inconsistent or conflicting with the provisions concerning the time for taking
an appeal from a decision of an administrative body as found
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The appellant did not take his appeal (May 27, 1977)
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within one month from the entry of the order appealed

fr~

(April 25, 1977) or within one month from notice of the adverse decision (April 26, 1977).

Therefore, the district

court had no authority to entertain further proceedings on
the appeal, and the appeal was property dismissed.
DATED this

day of November, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYL:

By~O.W@
David A. Westerby
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